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Reconceptualizing Due Process
in Juvenile Justice: Contributions
from Law and Social Science
MARK R. FONDACARO,* CHRISTOPHER NLOBOGIN** & TRICIA CROSS***
INTRODUCTION
The early juvenile court was rooted in the state's parens patriae
authority.' Its goal was to treat wayward juveniles according to their
"best interests" - akin to the way loving parents deal with their
disobedient offspring-rather than as fully accountable adults under the
criminal law.' Instead of prosecution and punishment, juveniles were
subject to "adjudication" and "disposition,"3 designed to help them
change for the better.
A crucial corollary to this avuncular theory of juvenile justice was
the belief that the procedures implementing it should also be different
from the adult model. More specifically, proponents of the juvenile court
thought that procedural "informality" would best serve the court's
* Mark Fondacaro, J.D., Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Psychology and Associate Director,
Levin College of Law Center on Children and Families, University of Florida.
** Christopher Slobogin, J.D., LL.M., occupies the Stephen C. O'Connell chair at the University
of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
*** Tricia Cross, J.D., M.A., is an Associate at Arnold & Porter LLP, in Los Angeles.
The authors would like to thank Norman Poythress, Tom Tyler, David Wexler, Lois Weithom,
Barbara Woodhouse, and participants in a workshop at the University of Florida College of law for
their comments on this Article.
I. Doug Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205
(97); cf. ANTHONY M. PLAIT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY I59 (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that the adoption of the parens patriae justification for juvenile court was "an ex post facto
fiction" designed to give spurious legitimacy to the new court).
2. Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America's "Juvenile Injustice
System," 22 PEPP. L. REv. 907, 911 (1995) (The juvenile court's "mission was to remove young
offenders from criminal courts and to provide them with the care and supervision typical of that found
in a stable and loving family.").
3. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 1999
NATIONAL REPORT SERIES, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A CENTURY OF CHANGE 11-12 (Dec. 1999), available at




substantive objective of individualized care.' Thus, for more than half a
century, the juvenile justice system functioned largely in the absence of
the procedural rules found in adult court and beyond the oversight and
review of the regular judicial system.
5
Over time, however, it became apparent that the juvenile justice
system was not living up either to its rehabilitative goal or to the
expectation that relaxed procedures would facilitate that goal. Among
legal scholars, courts and other policymakers, there was a growing belief
that procedural formality had been sacrificed for a rehabilitative agenda
that never materialized.6 The culmination of this criticism came in Justice
Fortas' famous speculation in Kent v. United States that those enmeshed
in the juvenile justice system were receiving "the worst of both
worlds:... neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."7
Given the Court's long-standing reticence about using substantive
due process to order change in state practices,8 the "world" the justices
decided to alter was the procedural one. And the way it sought to heal
the systemic wound it perceived in Kent was to transplant adult
procedures to the juvenile context. Subsequent Court decisions provided
juveniles with the rights to counsel, silence, cross-examination, and
almost all of the rest of the adult procedural armamentarium.9
Important to note, however, is that this procedural revolution was
based in large part on the general language of the Due Process Clause,
not the specific adversarial guarantees in the Sixth Amendment
providing for notice, public jury trial, confrontation, compulsory process
and counsel in "all criminal prosecutions.' ' 0 In other words, the Court
4. See infra text accompanying notes 20-23.
5. SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 745 (I997) ("From the earliest
beginnings until Justice Fortas's decision in Kent in 1966, juvenile courts operated without legal
oversight or monitoring.").
6. See, e.g., Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Juvenile Delinquency,
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., IST SESS. (t959-t96o); Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the
Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7,7 (1965).
7. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
8. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358 (3d ed. 1986) (detailing the Court's retreat
from Lochnerian substantive activism out of concern that it was trenching on legislative prerogatives,
while it maintained rigorous review of procedural due process claims).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 39-45.
so. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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imposed the adult model on the juvenile court not because the language
of the Constitution required it, but because the adult model was
considered necessary to avoid deprivations of liberty without "due
process of law."" That interpretive approach means that, if it turns out
other procedural mechanisms can be shown to be just as "fair" as the
adversarial model, those mechanisms might satisfy the Constitution.
Much legal scholarship on the juvenile justice system, however, has
assumed just the opposite. Most scholars seem to think it obvious that
the Sixth Amendment, as well as the Fifth Amendment's right to silence,
should apply to juveniles, and that juvenile procedures should be the
same as or even more adversarial than those in adult court. 2 Indeed,
some commentators have proposed the abolition of the juvenile justice
system as a separate procedural entity. 3 Consistent with Justice Fortas'
observation, abolitionists remain skeptical about the reality and potential
for rehabilitation, but are much more sanguine about the benefits of
traditional procedural due process. In effect, they assume that adult
criminal procedural requirements are synonymous with "due process."
This Article provides a critical analysis of this premise. We argue
that the pinnacle of procedural due process is not necessarily
synonymous with adult criminal procedure requirements, and that
youngsters can be afforded comparable or even enhanced procedural
due process in other ways.'" Based on concepts of justice rooted in
empirical research, we present a framework for reconceptualizing due
I . See infra text accompanying notes 55-68.
12. See, e.g., Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L.
REV. 146, 167 (1989) ("I advocate a juvenile court that has more, rather than fewer, procedural
protections available than in criminal courts."); Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some
Observations on a Recent Trend, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 129, 147 (1987) ("Juvenile proceedings are
'criminal' in nature when punishment is the sanction imposed. Therefore, the full trappings of the
criminal process, including trial by jury in hearings open to the public, are constitutionally
mandated."); Irene M. Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime:
Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656,720-21 (i98o) ("In the context
... of a delinquency adjudicatory proceeding that may lead to stigmatization and loss of liberty, the
child's immaturity often requires that the constitutional protection afforded be greater than that given
to adults.").
13. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case
for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. io83, 1120 (1991) ("Treating juveniles differently
from adults-by denying them jury trials, for example-violates the consistency norm of equal
treatment for all and reminds the young that they do not have all the rights assigned to full-fledged
members of the society."); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 97 (1998) ("Procedural justice
requires providing youths with full procedural parity with adult defendants and additional safeguards
to account for the disadvantages of youth in the justice system."); cf. Katherine H. Federle, The
Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J.
CONTEMP. L. 23, 23-24 (990).
14. Parts of this Article are based on Mark R. Fondacaro, Reconceptualizing Due Process in
Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Behavioral Science (Dec. 7, 2001) (paper presented at the
ist Annual Conference of the University of Florida Center on Children and the Law).
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process in juvenile justice with the ultimate aim of striking an optimal
balance between fairness, accuracy, and efficiency in handling
delinquency cases. Rather than mechanically turning to adult criminal
procedure as the gold standard of due process, we propose the adoption
of a performance-based management system that draws on both modern
trends in administrative law and recent advances in social science
research concerning procedural justice and decisionmaking. While we
believe that the procedural framework we present can and should
effectively be linked to the rejuvenation of rehabilitative and preventive
goals of the juvenile justice system, the merits of our procedural
framework also should appeal to those committed to more punitive and
retributivist regimes.
Part I of this Article briefly recaps the substantive and procedural
history of the juvenile court. Its primary message is that the Supreme
Court's procedural reform of the juvenile justice system was based on the
Due Process Clause and general principles of fundamental fairness,
which leaves the door open to flexible approaches to juvenile justice
procedure. Part II then plumbs developments in the broader
constitutional jurisprudence of procedure, particularly in the
administrative and civil law arenas, which enthusiastically endorse a
flexible view of due process. With the legal groundwork laid for the
proposition that juvenile justice procedure can be rethought, Part III
summarizes research on "procedural justice," which suggests that the
adversarial model of procedure is not necessarily the most "just,"
whether viewed from a subjective or objective perspective. Part IV closes
with a discussion of the implications of this research, and a proposal that
due process in juvenile justice be reconceptualized in a way that allows
empirical research and a performance-based management system to
identify those procedures that best promote fairness, accuracy and
efficiency.
I. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN JUVENILE COURT
The pendulum swings of juvenile justice in this country are a well-
known story. Before the twentieth century minors were tried as adults.
The advent of a separate juvenile court with a rehabilitative orientation
swung the pendulum the other way. In the last two decades, however,
concern about juvenile crime and pessimism about rehabilitation has
pushed juvenile justice back toward the common law approach. The
substance and procedure of today's juvenile court are much closer to the
adult model than they were forty years ago. But that does not mean the
pendulum could not swing back yet again.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Under the common law, minors charged with crime were tried in
[Vol. 57:955
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adult court. They were exempted from criminal responsibility if they
were under 7 years of age, but held fully accountable for their crimes if
they were over 14. In between those ages, they were presumed
irresponsible, but that presumption was rebuttable.' 5 If convicted,
children were often housed with adult prisoners.'
6
Around the turn of the twentieth century, a dramatic change took
place. Reformers and social scientists successfully nudged the dividing
line between "youthful immaturity" and "adult maturity" to late
adolescence, motivated by both a desire to avoid commercial
exploitation of young people, especially immigrants, and a belief that
youngsters were "works-in-progress" who needed additional time to
prepare for the assumption of adult roles and responsibilities." The legal
implementation of these ideas, in full flower nationwide by the 1930s,
was the juvenile court, a separate system from adult court designed to
"reform" children in trouble during their formative years so they would
not develop into career criminals.
The rehabilitative focus of the juvenile courts was accompanied by
procedural informality, the near total absence, as one commentary put it,
of "law, lawyers, reporters, and the usual paraphernalia of courts."'
Judge Mack, one of the progenitors of the juvenile court, captured the
idea nicely with his idyllic image of how the court should function:
"Seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put
his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while
losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the
effectiveness of his work."'" As this statement suggests, the logic behind
the relaxation of procedure was that judicial understanding of the child's
character, lifestyle, and underlying problems, and thus of the appropriate
treatment, could only be obtained through informal conversation. " The
15. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (describing common law doctrine).
I6. PAUL R. KFOURY, CHILDREN BEFORE THE COURT: REFLECTIONS ON LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING
MINORS 37 (2d ed. I991) ("If convicted, [the juveniles] were cast into a common prison with older
culprits to mingle in conversation and intercourse with them, acquire their habits, and by their
instruction to be made acquainted with the most artful methods of perpetrating crime." (quoting New
York Society for the Reformation of Delinquents, 1826 Annual Report 4 (1827))).
17. DAVID ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205-07 (i98o).
18. See Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 1095 (describing the "child-study movement" of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
19. PLATr, supra note 1, at 9-io (stating that by 1917, all but three states had a separate juvenile
court, and by 1932, over 6oo juvenile courts existed nationwide).
2o. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 745.
21. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104,120 (1909).
22. SUSAN GUARINO-GHEZZI & EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, BALANCING JUVENILE JUSTICE 90 (1995)
(calling the juvenile court process a "conversation"); see also In Re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 25-26 (1967)
("The early concept[ ] ... of the Ujuvenile [c]ourt proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge
touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over [his or her] problems, by paternal
advice and admonition ...." (quoting Mack, supra note 21, at 120)).
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adult adversarial process was thought to be counterproductive for
children; it was seen as stigmatizing, traumatizing, and above all else
irrelevant, given that the primary role of the court was to encourage
rehabilitation, not to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the
child committed a bad act.23
By the end of the 1970s, however, the pendulum had swung back
toward the adult model, with a vengeance. On the substantive side,
observers of the juvenile system, including social scientists, had
concluded that "nothing works" when it comes to the rehabilitation of
wayward juveniles.24 Simultaneously, the perception grew among the
public that increasingly younger children were committing increasingly
heinous crimes, while a lax juvenile justice system exacerbated the
situation by failing to impose appropriate punishment and capitalize on
its deterrent effect. 5 Moreover, many came to believe that the treatment-
oriented juvenile system contributed to moral failure among youth by
failing to instill a sense of personal responsibility for behavior." Finally,
even those who were not convinced that harsh punishment of juveniles
was appropriate were concerned about abuse resulting from the absence
of procedural rules in juvenile court.27
The changes stemming from these various reactions were legion. On
the substantive side, many jurisdictions eliminated or downgraded
"status" offense jurisdiction for conduct like truancy and unruly
23. Mack, supra note 21, at Io9, 119-20 (speaking of the need to avoid the stigmatization of
criminal prosecution and stating that the primary determination to be made in juvenile court was not
whether the juvenile is guilty but "what is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be
done in his interest and the interest of the state to save him from downward career"); PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND YOUTH CRIME 3 (1967) (describing the interest of juvenile court reformers in avoiding the
punitive atmosphere of adult court).
24. Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile
Court, 1i6 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 116o (1968) ("The evidence from [social science] studies suggests that
the publicized goals of the juvenile court are rarely achieved."); cf. Robert Martinson, What Works? -
Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (1974) ("With few and isolated
exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on
recidivism.").
25. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REv. 799, 8o6-o9 (2oo3)
(describing public, legislative, and media responses to the perceived threat of juvenile offenders, and
how these responses interacted to create a "moral panic").
26. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 84 MINN. L. REV. 347, 390 (I999)
("The juvenile court's treatment ideology denied youths' personal responsibility, reduced offenders'
duty to exercise self-control, and eroded their obligations to change. If there is any silver lining in the
current cloud of "get tough" policies, it is the affirmation of responsibility.").
27. See, e.g., Margaret K. Rosenheim, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts: Old Wine in a
New Bottle, I FAM. L.Q. 25, 29 (1967) (Adult-like protections are recommended because of the need to
reach "an accommodation between the aspirations of the founders of the juvenile court and the grim
realities of life against which, in part, the due process of criminal and civil law offers us protection.").
See generally ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (0978).
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behavior," lowered the age at which children could be transferred to
adult court for most crimes, and required transfer for a wide array of
serious offenses, in some states for children as young as eleven. 9 Many
states softened the impact of the latter two changes by providing that
juveniles who were convicted in adult court be subject to juvenile
sentences or "blended" juvenile/adult sentences for most crimes." But
the overall thrust of juvenile justice reform in the i97os and i98os was to
"get tough" on young offenders, a movement that ran parallel to the
increased sentences being handed out to adult offenders during this time
period.' This tendency has pretty much continued unabated through
today.32
More relevant to this Article, however, are the procedural changes
that occurred. These were prompted in large part by the U.S. Supreme
Court in a series of decisions between 1966 and 1971. The overall impact
of these decisions was to convert the juvenile court from an informal
conversation into an adversarial proceeding.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S PROCEDURAL REVOLUTION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
As late as 1966, the Supreme Court had not decided a single case
involving juvenile court issues.33 In part, this judicial abstinence had more
to do with the Court's changing view of its role as a national guardian of
liberties than with juvenile court per se. Only in the early i96os had the
Court even begun looking seriously at the adult criminal process: the
Sixth Amendment's right to trial counsel was not imposed on the states
until 1963,"4 while the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses did not apply nationally until 1964 and 1965,
28. In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, which
required states receiving delinquency prevention funds to divert or de-institutionalize youth who had
been referred for status offenses, 42 U.S.C. § 56oi, and today prohibits detention of such offenders "in
secure detention facilities or secure correctional facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(I i)(A) (2ooo).
29. For a description of transfer statutes and a state-by-state review as of 1997, see OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMs: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT io6 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/
nationalreport99/toc.html. This document notes that, as of 1997, twenty-two states and the District of
Columbia no longer impose any minimum age requirement for at least one method of transferring
jurisdiction to adult court. Id.
30. Id. at io8 (describing the blended sentences movement and the states that have adopted it).
31. Cathi J. Hunt, Juvenile Sentencing: Effects of Recent Punitive Sentencing Legislation on
Juvenile Offenders and a Proposal for Sentencing in Juvenile Court, i9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 621,
624-33, 659 (1999) (comparing developments in adult and juvenile sentencing regimes and noting the
increasingly punitive approach toward both groups).
32. Id. at 623 ("As a result of these legislative changes, juveniles today face more severe sanctions
than at any time since the inception of the juvenile justice system nearly a century ago.").
33. Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
SuP. CT. REV. 167. 167 (1966).
34. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,342 (1963).
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respectively.35 But part of the Court's silence on juvenile court issues was
also due to the aforementioned lack of judicial oversight, even by the
lower courts, over this separate system of justice.
Once the Supreme Court commenced its scrutiny of the juvenile
courts, however, it did so with alacrity. Its first decision addressing a
juvenile justice issue, Kent v. United States,36 involved a sixteen-year-old
boy who was summarily transferred from juvenile to adult court once he
admitted to the police that he had participated in housebreaking,
robbery and rape.37 The Court held, unanimously, that the failure to
convene a transfer hearing to determine whether Kent should have been
tried as an adult violated the Constitution.: The era of unbridled
discretion in juvenile justice was suddenly over.
The year after Kent, the Supreme Court considered another case
with even more important ramifications for juvenile justice procedure. In
In re Gault,39 a fifteen-year-old boy was committed by a juvenile court to
a state industrial school for a maximum of almost six years (the
remainder of his minority status), simply for making an obscene phone
call to a neighbor.0 Had Gault been an adult he would have faced no
more than a $50 fine or a maximum of two months in jail.4' Furthermore,
of course, he would have been entitled to the full panoply of procedural
safeguards guaranteed to adults.
Instead, he received virtually no procedural protections. Neither
Gault nor his parents ever received formal notice of the charge.42 At the
initial hearing the day after his arrest, with no lawyer and in the absence
of Miranda warnings (which the Supreme Court had required in adult
proceedings the year before),'3 Gault was questioned by the judge about
whether he made lewd calls.' He was then detained, without explanation
as far as the record showed, in a children's detention home for three or
four days pending his adjudicatory hearing.45 At that hearing the
probation officer, testifying unsworn, described un-Mirandized
statements made by Gault while he was in the detention home, and also
presented a "referral report" to the judge, which the Gaults were not
35. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. i, 6 (t964) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination).
36. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
37. Id. at 544, 546.
38. Id. at 553-54.
39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
40. Id. at 4-9.
41. Id. at 8-9.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5-6.
45. Id. at 6.
[VOL. 57:955
DUE PROCESS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
allowed to see.46 Nor was the complaining neighbor present at the
hearing." Had she been there, Gault or his parents would have had to
conduct cross-examination themselves, because his family had not
retained a lawyer, and had never been told they could do so."
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that this barebones
procedure, one replicated every day in juvenile courts around the
country, did not offend the requirements of the "due process concept."49
But the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a
delinquency proceeding might lead to confinement in a state institution
the state must provide: (i) written notice to the child and to the child's
parents of the charges against the child, provided far enough in advance
to allow for preparation for the hearing; (2) a right to counsel, including
the right to have counsel appointed free of charge if the child or family is
unable to afford one; (3) the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, who are required to testify under oath; and (4) the privilege
against self-incrimination." In short, juveniles were now to receive most
of the procedural protections accorded adults under the Sixth and Fifth
Amendments.
Three years later, in In re Winship,5' the Supreme Court
administered the final touch to its "adultification" of the juvenile
delinquency process.52 The Court first held that adults may not be
convicted of a criminal offense unless its essential elements are proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.53 It then applied that holding to the
adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding.14 With this decision, and
within a five-year period, the Court had imposed virtually all of the adult
criminal procedure guarantees on the juvenile process.
An important aspect of these three Supreme Court decisions that is
often ignored, however, is their legal basis. Adult criminal procedures
flow primarily from the Sixth Amendment. Kent, Gault and Winship, on
46. Id. at 7.
47- Id.
48. Id. at io.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 31-59.
51. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
52. We do not mean to neglect Breed v. Jones, which applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to
juvenile delinquency proceedings, with Chief Justice Burger himself writing that "it is simply too late
in the day to conclude ... that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a [delinquency] proceeding." 421
U.S. 519, 529 (1975). However, this decision is not "procedural" in the sense we have been using that
word in this Article to refer to the rules governing the adjudication process. Rather, it determined
whether an acquittal or conviction in juvenile court may be relitigated in adult court. Furthermore,
within three years of Breed, the Court upheld a state procedure that allowed prosecutors in juvenile
court to appeal referee decisions acquitting a child of delinquency charges, a decision that significantly
undermines the thrust of Breed. Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
53. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
54. Id. at 368.
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the other hand, relied almost exclusively on the Due Process Clause.
That difference affords a much greater degree of flexibility in
constructing a procedural framework.
The Court recognized this fact in all three decisions. For instance, in
Kent, in the sentence immediately following his well-known "worst of
both worlds" observation, Justice Fortas stated "[tihis concern, however,
does not induce us... to accept the invitation to rule that constitutional
guaranties which would be applicable to adults charged with... serious
offenses ... must be applied in juvenile court proceedings.""5 Thus,
Fortas stated, while juveniles in Kent's situation were entitled to counsel,
access to relevant records, and a statement of reasons for the transfer
decision, the transfer hearing could still be "informal" and need not
"conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the
usual administrative hearing."" In short, the procedural adequacy of the
hearing granted in Kent was to be measured not by the extent to which it
copied or incorporated all of the requirements of a criminal trial but
rather by whether it functioned in accordance with principles of
fundamental fairness.57
In Gault as well, the Supreme Court anchored its requirements
regarding notice, counsel and confrontation in what it called "due
process standards," which it cautioned should be "intelligently and not
ruthlessly administered" in the juvenile context;:8 only the right to
silence, found in the Fifth Amendment, was derived from a more specific
Bill of Rights guarantee. In essence, Justice Fortas' majority opinion
adopted a hybrid approach. The majority's result was identical to that
reached by Justice Black in his concurring opinion, which argued that the
procedural safeguards the Court adopted were tied to the explicit text of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 9 but its rationale was closer to Justice
Harlan's concurring and dissenting opinion, which contended that all of
the constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards in the delinquency
context should stem from the Due Process Clause and derive from basic
concerns about "fundamental fairness. ' 6
For this reason, Harlan's framework for analyzing procedural due
process is worth a closer look. He argued that the process due in juvenile
proceedings should depend on three criteria:
[F]irst, no more restrictions should be imposed than are imperative to
55. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 556 (1966).
56. Id. at 561-62.
57. Id.
58. In re Gault. 387 U.S.I. 21 (1967).
59. Id. at 64 (Black, J., concurring) ("I do not vote to invalidate this Arizona law on the ground
that it is 'unfair' but solely on the ground that it violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments made
obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
6o. Id. at 65-78 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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assure the proceeding's fundamental fairness; second, the restrictions
which are imposed should be those which preserve, so far as possible,
the essential elements of the State's purpose; and finally, restrictions
should be chosen which will later permit the orderly selection of any
additional protections which may ultimately prove necessary. In this
way, the Court may guarantee the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding, and yet permit the State to continue development of an
effective response to the problems of juvenile crime.6'
Applying these criteria, Harlan would have required that those subjected
to juvenile delinquency proceedings be afforded only the rights to notice,
state-paid counsel if institutionalization was possible, and a written
record maintained by the court.6' Although the majority obviously
believed that these prescriptions were not enough, its reliance on the
Due Process Clause at least did not unalterably foreclose use of Harlan's
more flexible analysis.
In Winship, the Supreme Court relied on the same hybrid formula it
adopted in Gault. As in Gault, the Court equated the adult and juvenile
standards, but the basis of the decision was the Due Process Clause (as it
had to be, given the absence of any specific supporting constitutional
language for either adults or juveniles).' The Court also emphasized that
its holding with respect to juveniles would not have "any effect on the
informality, flexibility, or speed of the hearing at which the factfinding
takes place," nor would it affect the informality of the pre-hearing or
dispositional phases of the juvenile process.6" Justice Harlan wrote a
concurring opinion agreeing that any lesser standard of proof "offends
the requirement of fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"'65 and emphasizing the minimal
impact that holding would have on the rest of the juvenile system.
66
None of this should obscure the fact that these three decisions made
the juvenile court look very similar to adult criminal court. In his dissent
in Winship, Chief Justice Burger was not persuaded by the assurances in
the majority and concurring opinions in that case. He warned:
What the juvenile court system needs is not more but less of the
trappings of legal procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile court
system requires breathing room and flexibility in order to survive ....
I cannot regard it as a manifestation of progress to transform juvenile
courts into criminal courts, which is what we are well on the way to
accomplishing. We can only hope the legislative response will not
6i. Id. at 7 2 .
62. Id.
63. This was the main complaint of Justice Black in dissent. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-86
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 366 (majority opinion).
65. Id. at 369 (Harlan, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 375.
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reflect our own by having these courts abolished.67
At the time, these comments could have been read as somewhat
hyperbolic. But, as outlined earlier in this Article, a number of factors,
including the Court's case law, have brought Justice Burger's forecast
close to fruition.68
At the same time, the conceptual difference between the two
procedural systems is real. That much Burger helped make clear in
joining McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,69 the decision that provided the
strongest signal yet that the Supreme Court is serious about
differentiating the legal bases for the adult and juvenile systems. Decided
one year after Winship, McKeiver held that, in contrast to adults,
juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial.70 As in Kent,
Gault and Winship, instead of grounding its analysis in the constitutional
text of the Sixth Amendment-which guarantees the right to a public,
jury trial in all criminal prosecutions -the Court framed the issue in due
process terms.7 The difference between McKeiver and the Court's other
juvenile justice decisions is the extent to which it emphasized this point.
Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion began by stressing that Kent,
Gault, and Winship had consciously refrained from equating juvenile
delinquency with adult criminal proceedings.72 Then, in a more definitive
tone than it had in the past, the Court asserted that the adequacy of
procedural requirements in the context of delinquency adjudications
should be assessed solely according to whether they "'measure[d] up to
the essentials of due process and fair treatment."'73 Using this metric, the
Court reasoned that because a jury is not necessary to obtain "accurate"
results,74 and because of the need to maintain the "intima[cy]" of the
juvenile proceeding and avoid the "clamor" of the adversarial process,
the failure to provide juries to juveniles would not be fundamentally
67. Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
68. See also Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform
Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 712-13 (noting that many states
have amended the policy section of their juvenile code to emphasize punishment over rehabilitation).
69. 403 U.S. 528 (197I).
70. Id. at 545.
71. Id. at 541 ("[OJur task here with respect to trial by jury, as it was in Gault with respect to
other claimed rights, 'is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement."' (citation
omitted)).
72. Id. at 533 ("The Court, however, has not yet said that all rights constitutionally assured to an
adult accused of crime also are to be enforced or made available to the juvenile in his delinquency
proceeding. Indeed, the Court specifically has refrained from going that far.").
73. Id. at 533-34 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)). The Court continued:
"The Court has insisted that these successive decisions do not spell the doom of the juvenile court
system or even deprive it of its 'informality, flexibility, or speed."' Id. at 534 (quoting In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358,366 (1970))).
74- Id. at 543.
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unfair. 5 In language that sums up application of the due process model to
juvenile court, the Court added: "We are reluctant to disallow the States
to experiment further and to seek in new and different ways the elusive
answers to the problems of the young, and we feel that we would be




This crowning decision of the due process era in juvenile justice
made clear that, despite the "adultification" of the juvenile court, Justice
Harlan's fundamental fairness theory had taken root. Yet legal scholars
who recite that Gault ushered in an era in which juvenile offenders
secured the procedural safeguards afforded adult criminal defendants
tend to gloss over the fact that, with the exception of the right to silence,
these safeguards were derived from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.77 Beyond this nonchalant attitude toward the
legal basis of the Court's decision, there seems to be an assumption that
the Court's fundamental fairness theory is merely an artifact of its
decision to exclude the juvenile justice system from the ambit of the
"criminal prosecutions" mentioned in the Sixth Amendment. In fact,
however, this theory is entirely consistent with the Court's adoption of a
more flexible approach to procedural questions in other settings.
II. OTHER VISIONS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
[Tihe Supreme Court has yielded too readily to the notions that the
adversary system is the only appropriate model and that there is only
one acceptable solution to any problem, and consequently has been
too prone to indulge in constitutional codification. There is a need for
experimentation, particularly for the use of the investigative model, for
empirical studies, and for avoiding absolutes."
Although these comments, made by Judge Friendly in 1975, were
foreshadowed by McKeiver four years earlier, and could be seen as
critical of Gault, they were not prompted by the Court's juvenile justice
decisions but rather were a reaction to developments in administrative
law in the early 197os. In particular, Friendly's criticism was aimed at
Goldberg v. Kelly,79 a 1970 Supreme Court decision about procedure in
75- Id. at 545, 550.
76. Id. at 547.
77. Indeed, a number of articles, mostly by students, declare that Gault was based on the Sixth
Amendment. David T. Huang, "Less Unequal Footing": State Courts' Per Se Rules for Juvenile
Waivers During Interrogations and the Case for Their Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 437, 445
(2OO) ("Gault unequivocally concluded that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to juveniles with
equal force as they do to adults."). Yet the Court has clearly held otherwise. In McKeiver, five justices
(the four-member plurality plus Justice Brennan) agreed that juvenile delinquency proceedings are
not "criminal prosecutions." See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1978) (plurality
opinion); id. at 553 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan appeared to
agree as well, but did not do so explicitly. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1316 (1975).
79- 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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welfare cases that could be called the Gault of administrative law,
because of its preference for the traditional adversarial model of dispute
resolution. Unlike Gault, however, Goldberg's influence was short-lived.
In 1976, the year after Judge Friendly's article was published, the Court
decided Mathews v. Eldridge,"' a case that has come to define modem
trends toward administrative, as opposed to judicial, models of
procedural justice.
The due process revolution in juvenile justice is usefully compared
to these parallel developments in the administrative/civil realm, because
the latter developments reinforce the case for a fundamental fairness
approach to juvenile justice that is not wedded to adult criminal
procedure safeguards. In its due process decisions involving adult
administrative settings, the post-Mathews Court has definitively rejected
a one-size-fits-all procedural model and instead seems to be following
Judge Friendly's injunction to experiment with different approaches.
Even in situations that involve significant deprivations of juveniles'
liberty and property, application of Mathews' framework has produced
decisions that resonate with Harlan's and Friendly's flexible approach
rather than with Gault's equation of procedural due process with the
adult criminal trial.
A. DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SETrING
Before the 197os, administrative decisionmaking, like
decisionmaking in the juvenile process before 1966, was not a major
concern of the Supreme Court."' On those few occasions when the Court
held that the Constitution required any process in such proceedings, it
only demanded a little, "however brief" and "however informal.""'
Above all, the Court saw the due process inquiry as a flexible one,
immortalized in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath:
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for
that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries
of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization, "due
process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any
formula.... Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a
yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment
8o. 424 U.S. 359 (1976).
81. See WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 142, 144 (1997) (explaining
that the "Supreme Court did not seem particularly interested in questions of agency procedure
through the first Ioo years or so of our constitutional history," then decided a few important cases in
the early part of the twentieth century, but subsequently merely "tinkered with agency due process
over the next fifty years").
82. Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (i9o8) (holding that a landowner is entitled to
contest a city assessment not only in writing, as the city permitted, but also through a hearing where
the landowner "shall have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need
be, by proof, however informal").
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inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the
Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.... The
precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available
alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit
in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the
balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished -these are
some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment.8'
This context-dependent due process analysis was seriously
challenged, albeit only briefly and indirectly, with the Court's decision in
Goldberg. In Goldberg-decided three years after Gault, the same term
as Winship, and one year before McKeiver-the Supreme Court
addressed the procedure for terminating a mother's welfare benefits
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. The Court
began somewhat ambivalently. It agreed with the petitioner that some
sort of pre-termination hearing was required because loss of benefits
would put her in an "immediately desperate" situation.84 But it also
stated that the hearing "need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-
judicial trial.",8' Rather it need merely meet "minimum procedural
safeguards, adapted to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients,
and to the limited nature of the controversies to be resolved."86 To this
point, the opinion sounded like something Justice Harlan or Justice
Frankfurter might have written.
But it soon became Gault-like. The Court held that the "minimum"
procedural requirements for carrying out benefits terminations were: (i)
timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for termination; (2) the
opportunity to appear personally before the decisionmaker and make
oral arguments and present evidence (entitlements the Court thought
necessary given the likely difficulty many welfare recipients would have
with written submissions and the usefulness of "mold[ing one's]
argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as
important"); (3) the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses; (4) the right to retain an attorney at personal expense; (5) a
statement by the decisionmaker indicating the reasons for the
determination and the evidence relied on; and (6) an impartial
decisionmaker who was not involved in making the decision under
review. 8' The only adult criminal procedural safeguards missing from this
list were the right to counsel at state expense and the right to a jury or
written findings of fact.
Goldberg was roundly criticized, both within the Court and without,
83. 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (i95i) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
84. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
85. Id. at 266.
86. Id. at 267.
87. Id. at 267-71.
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for imposing costly procedures on a simple decision. Yet the case led to
what some commentators called a "due process explosion"' 9 throughout
the early 1970s, lasting until the decision in Mathews.' During this period
courts tended to "judicialize" administrative decisionmaking procedures
in any setting where individuals faced the potential loss of liberty or
property, broadly defined, at the hands of a government actor.9' In
essence, they treated due process more like a "mechanical instrument"
than the "delicate process of adjustment" envisioned by Justice
Frankfurter.
In the midst of this due process explosion, it was often forgotten that
the Goldberg Court had, in theory at least, agreed with Justice
Frankfurter about the need for due process to be context-dependent.
The Supreme Court's decision in Mathews six years later recognized as
much, and took the principle very seriously. Its emphasis on the flexible
nature of due process ultimately put the brakes on the constitutional
codification of traditional adversarial safeguards outside adult criminal
setting.
The issue in Mathews was whether Social Security disability benefits,
as distinguished from the welfare benefits at issue in Goldberg, could be
terminated without an evidentiary hearing. Seven members of the Court
concluded that no hearing is required in such situations.92 Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court first established that due process analysis requires
consideration of the following three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
88. Judge Friendly's opposition has already been noted. See Friendly, supra note 78, at 1284-85,
1316. In Goldberg itself, Justice Black argued that the costly procedures required by the majority
would reduce the funds available for welfare recipients and make welfare bureaucrats more reluctant
to find poor individuals eligible for welfare. 397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting). Professor
Mashaw documented these concerns in his study of New York's welfare system. See generally Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in Adjudication of
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974).
89. This phrase was first used by Judge Friendly, and has been adopted by a number of
commentators. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 8-9 (1985); Fox,
supra note 81, at I44; Friendly, supra note 78, at 1268.
9o. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,349 (976).
9
i. See Friendly, supra note 78, at 13oo-oI; Richard J. Pierce, The Due Process Counterrevolution
of the I99os?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, I980 (1996) (noting that the "combined effect" of Goldberg and
other Court decisions between i97o and 1972 was "to expand the scope of due process protection to
encompass hundreds of new 'property' and 'liberty' interests" and that "Goldberg suggested that the
government is required to provide a formal trial-type hearing before it could deprive anyone of any of
the newly recognized constitutional interests").
92. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
[Vol. 57:955
DUE PROCESS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
requirement would entail.93
Applying this test, the Court found that termination of disability benefits
was not as significant a hardship as termination of welfare benefits
(because people with disabilities often have other sources of income);'
that adversarial procedures were not as important when the focus of the
decision is objective medical evidence, as is the case with disability
determinations;95 and that the costs of elaborate hearings "may in the end
come out of the pockets of the deserving."96
Mathews' three-part test, often described as requiring a balancing of
fairness, accuracy, and efficiency considerations,7 has provided the
framework for most of the Supreme Court's due process cases since the
mid I97OS. 9" The framework provides considerable latitude for
informality and flexibility, and has now been applied to a wide variety of
contexts. 99 The contexts most relevant for our purposes are those
involving juveniles.
B. JUVENILE DUE PROCESS IN NON-DELINQUENCY SETTINGS
A precursor to Mathews by one year, but completely consistent with
its approach, is the Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez."° There
the Court held that a hearing is required before schools may subject
students to suspensions of ten days or more, because without a hearing
the chance of an erroneous deprivation of the student's entitlement to a
public education is too high.'' However, the Court went on to conclude
that the due process "hearing" need only consist of an informal meeting
between the student and the relevant school official, at which the student
is informed of the charge and is permitted to tell his or her side of the
story; a judicial hearing, the Court noted, "might well overwhelm
administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost
93. Id. at 335.
94. Id. at 340-41.
95. Id. at 343-44.
96. Id. at 348.
97. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
28 (1976).
98. We say "most" decisions, because for a time a segment of the Court seemed willing to ignore
even the minimal requirements imposed by Mathews and adopt a position of complete deference to
legislative decisionmaking. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 68i (1977) (holding that lack of
procedure associated with paddling a student was the product of a "legislative judgment, rooted in
history"). However, in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541-48 (1985), the
Court explicitly rejected that approach.
99. See, e.g., II KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 53
(1994).
too. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
soi. Id. at 580 ("[T]he risk of error is not at all trivial.").
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more than it would save in educational effectiveness ..... Despite the
finding that the suspension involved a non-trivial property deprivation,
the Court did not refer to Gault or any other juvenile justice decision.
Of course, a ten-day suspension from school is not comparable to
the six-year commitment that faced Gerald Gault. Outside the
delinquency context, the Supreme Court decision involving the most
closely analogous situation to Gault is Parham v. J.R., 3 decided three
years after Mathews. There, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether an adversarial proceeding was required prior to a juvenile's civil
commitment to a state psychiatric facility by the juvenile's parents or
guardians. The three-judge federal district court, relying on Gault, held
that due process in the juvenile commitment context required adequate
notice and an adversary-type pre-deprivation hearing before an impartial
judicial or quasi-judicial body. 4 But the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that due process was satisfied simply by an evaluation from a
neutral factfinder, who could be the admitting psychiatrist. 5 Thus, Chief
Justice Burger concluded for six members of the Court, if the parents or
guardian seek admission and the neutral evaluator determines that
evidence of mental illness exists and that the child is suitable for
treatment, the child may be admitted to a psychiatric facility.'
6
In justifying this decision, the Court used Mathews' three-factor
balancing test, looking at the first and third factors (the private interest at
stake and efficiency) before examining the second, risk of error, factor.
The Court conceded that civil commitment of a minor implicates the
juvenile's constitutionally protected liberty interest." However, the
Court reasoned that this liberty interest was qualified by and coupled
with the parental interest in the child's well-being. While recognizing that
parents do not always act in their child's best interests, the Court was
willing to assume that they normally do, an assumption that weighed
against highly formal procedures when parents seek care for their
children. "" The Court also agreed with the state's argument that
adversarial proceedings were an inefficient means of meeting its goals, by
noting the benefits of speedy care, the need to minimize the time mental
health professionals spend in admission proceedings, and the concern
102. Id. at 582-83.
103. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
IO4- Id. at 596-98 & n.7.
105. Id. at 607 ("[A] staff physician will suffice, so long as he or she is free to evaluate
independently the child's mental and emotional condition and need for treatment.").
lo6. This was the outcome permitted by the decision, see id., although the Court did not directly
address the substantive criteria for commitment, only the appropriate procedures.
io7. Id. at 6oo.
io8. Id. at 604 ("[W]e conclude that our precedents permit the parents to retain a substantial, if
not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse, and that the traditional
presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child should apply.").
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that the costs of "hundreds-or even thousands-of hearings each
year ... would come from the public moneys the legislature intended for
mental health care."' 9
Finally, the Court was not convinced that adversarial procedures
were needed to reduce the risk of erroneous commitment, and even
suggested it might increase it. The commitment decision, the Court
reasoned, is primarily a medical, not a legal, judgment and thus less in
need of adversarial testing. ' The majority even went so far as to suggest
that the benefits of using adversary proceedings to assure
decisionmaking accuracy in this setting were "more illusory than real .....
Furthermore, such proceedings might pit parent against child, or the
child against his or her eventual therapist, which would bode ill for both
relationships."2 Thus, the Court was "satisfied that an independent
medical decisionmaking process, which includes [a] thorough psychiatric
investigation.., followed by additional periodic review of a child's
condition, will protect children who should not be admitted." Further,
the Court did not "believe the risks of error in that process would be
significantly reduced by a more formal, judicial-type hearing."'"3 The
Court saw no need for either a judge or a lawyer to be involved in the
process.
Although Goss and Parham are often characterized by critics as
cases that deny due process protections to juveniles,"4 both decisions did
in fact address issues at the heart of due process doctrine: truth seeking
and fairness. For example, the comprehensive evaluation required in
Parham, which the Court stated should "carefully probe the child's
background using all available sources, including, but not limited to,
parents, schools, and other social agencies [and] an interview with the
child," is clearly aimed at promoting decisionmaking accuracy. '
Moreover, although the child subject to commitment does not have the
right to call or cross examine witnesses, he or she is provided with some
"opportunity to be heard" through the required face-to-face interview, a
procedure that Goss also mandates for students subject to possible
suspension. At the same time, consistent with the framework outlined in
Mathews, in neither case was the Court concerned solely with issues of
accuracy and fairness of decisionmaking; it also explicitly addressed the
to9. Id. at 605-06.
Ito. Id. at 6o7-09.
iII. Id. at6o9.
112. Id. at 6Io.
113. Id. at 613.
114. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LoY U. CHI. L.J. Ill, 130
(2004) (criticizing Goss); Michael L. Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to
Chief Justice Warren Burger's "Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 149 (1981) (criticizing Parham).
I15. 442 U.S. at 6o6-o7.
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government's interest in the efficient use of public resources. Thus, as
noted above, in Goss the Court was worried about a "diversion of
resources" if it required more elaborate procedures, and in Parham it
likewise favored an investigative model over a legal adversary process in
part to ensure mental health professionals spend most of their time
treating youngsters in need rather than testifying in legal proceedings.
Parham is a particularly important decision for this discussion about
juvenile justice, because it dealt with civil commitment. Civil
commitment can result in a serious deprivation of liberty that can often
be as intrusive and as long in duration as the detention experienced by
juveniles charged with felony offenses,"6 yet the procedure outlined in
Parham is a far cry from that endorsed in Gault. That observation raises
what, for us, is a central question. Which procedural approach makes the
most sense from the standpoint of promoting fair and accurate
decisionmaking, public safety, and the well-being of children under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system: the adversarial procedural
framework outlined in Gault, or the investigative framework outlined in
Parham and inspired by Mathews?
We believe that, whatever the merits of Gault at the time it was
decided, today the investigative model informed by the Supreme Court's
analysis in Parham and Mathews holds the greater promise for promoting
these goals. We are not suggesting that the specific procedures permitted
in Parham (much less in Goss) be mechanically transplanted to the
context of delinquency adjudications. But we are arguing that the
Mathews-inspired investigative approach in Parham and Goss is far more
promising as a means of achieving a fundamentally fair system. To live
up to that promise, the procedural framework guiding the juvenile justice
system must be informed by modern social psychological research aimed
at understanding and promoting fairness, accuracy and efficiency.
III. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE:
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Recent due process cases have insisted on a multi-factor balancing
analysis that places as much emphasis on the risk of reducing error, the
116. The average length of civil commitment has shortened considerably in the past decade, to
fewer than forty-five days. See RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 814 (4th ed. 2004). However, perhaps twenty-five percent of those committed
stay in the hospital for over four years. Id. The majority in Parham did recognize that juveniles who
are committed are entitled to periodic review, 442 U.S. at 617, and Justice Brennan argued that such
review should be more adversarial in nature. Id. at 633-34 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). However, the majority refused to address this issue in any greater detail, stating
simply "we have no basis for determining whether the review procedures of the various hospitals are
adequate to provide the process called for or what process might be required if a child contests his
confinement by requesting a release." Id. at 617. Thus, as it stands, the staff physician procedure that is
adequate for initial admission may be adequate for periodic review as well.
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"value" of procedural safeguards, and systemic efficiency as it does on
liberty and property interests. Although some due process traditionalists
find this trend alarming, social and behavioral scientists, many of them
with legal training, are producing social psychological research that
suggests this type of balancing analysis may come closer to achieving
"just" procedures than a rigid adherence to the adversarial model. In
particular, research on "procedural justice" points to several ways in
which non-adversarial methods may be superior to the traditional adult
criminal procedural safeguards in certain settings.
The study of procedural justice in the social sciences largely traces its
roots to the pioneering work of John Thibaut, Laurens Walker, and their
colleagues in the 197os. This group coined the procedural justice term to
refer to the social psychological effects of varying decisionmaking
procedures, particularly with respect to the effects these procedural
variations have on fairness judgments.' In their groundbreaking work,
Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis,"' Thibaut and Walker used
empirical methods to explore differences between the adversary model
followed by American courts (where the parties are responsible for
producing evidence) and the inquisitorial model employed by courts in
many European countries (where the judge or a judicial delegate takes
on the investigative role).
In carrying out this research, Thibaut and Walker addressed both
"objective" and "subjective" aspects of procedural justice. As defined by
Allan Lind (a sometime colleague of Thibaut and Walker's) and Tom
Tyler, objective procedural justice is concerned with "the capacity of a
procedure to conform to the normative standards of justice, to make
either the decisions themselves or the decision-making process more fair
by, for example, reducing some clearly unacceptable bias or prejudice.""..9
Thus, objective aspects of procedural justice include accuracy of outcome
and the collection and use of available information. Subjective
procedural justice, in contrast, concerns the "capacity of each procedure
to enhance the fairness judgments of those who encounter the
procedures ..... Here the perceptions of the participants are the important
focal point. The following discussion begins with a description of findings
from Thibaut and Walker and others concerning subjective procedural
justice, and then examines empirical findings relevant to objective
procedural justice. These two aspects of social science research roughly
correspond to the fairness and accuracy considerations identified in
Mathews. The discussion in this Part ends with a brief comment on how
117. See John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1289 (1974).
118. JOHN THBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (975).
II9. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 3
(1988).
120. Id. at 3-4.
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social science can also address the efficiency prong of the Mathews
analysis.
A. SUBJECTIVE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE/FAIRNESS
One of the most significant findings of Thibaut and Walker's early
research was that satisfaction with dispute outcomes is substantially
affected by factors other than winning or losing the dispute.' Thus, even
those who fail to prevail on their claim nonetheless exhibit greater
outcome satisfaction and express greater willingness to accept the
decision when the procedures used to reach the decision are perceived as
fair. "This finding," Lind and Tyler have noted, "showed that it is
possible, by judicious choice and design of procedures, to enhance the
quality of social life without increasing the outcomes available for
distribution under the procedures .... .As Thibaut and Walker themselves
explained, subjective justice is "crucial because one of the major aims of
the legal process is to resolve conflicts in such a way as to bind up the
social fabric and encourage the continuation of productive exchange
between individuals.' ' .3 In short, subjective procedural justice is an
important means of getting both litigants and society at large to buy into
the decisions that resolve disputes.
Thibaut and Walker's early work, reported in the mid-1970s,
suggested that both disputants and the public preferred the adversary
system to the inquisitorial system, because they perceived the former
system's procedures to be fairer. More specifically, Thibaut and Walker
found that their research participants felt the adversarial mode gave
them more decision control (ability to "unilaterally determine the
outcome" of the case) and process control (ability to determine "the
development and selection of information"), and particularly more of the
latter." These perceptions of fairness, in turn, led to a greater willingness
to accept verdicts arrived at through adversary procedures rather than
those that resulted from an inquisitorial process,' 5 a preference shared
even by individuals from countries with inquisitorial systems.26
121. See, e.g., TH1MAur & WALKER, supra note iI8, at 8o (reporting a study finding that adversary
representation produced "greater satisfaction of the involved parties with the judgment, quite
independently of both the favorableness of the judgment and the participants' beliefs concerning the
issue under adjudication").
122. LIND & TYLER, supra note r I9, at 26.
123. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 18, at 67.
124. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REv. 541, 546 (I978).
125. Id. at 547. See generally, THIBAUr & WALKER, supra note ii8, at 18 ("It is perhaps the main
finding of the body of our research, therefore, that for litigation the class of procedures commonly
called 'adversary' is clearly superior.").
126. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 18, ch. 8 (finding respondents in four countries-the United
States, France, West Germany and Great Britain-all preferred the adversarial process to the
inquisitorial process).
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Thibaut and Walker's findings in this regard were compromised,
however, by the fact that they generally tested only "pure" models of
adversarial and inquisitorial systems. As they described these models,
"[i]n a pure adversary system, openly biased advocates urge their clients'
cases before a passive decisionmaker," while a "pure inquisitorial
system" involves "an expert decisionmaker [who] actively investigates
the claims of unrepresented litigants.' 27 In other words, Thibaut and
Walker's pure inquisitorial model prevented disputants (or their
representatives) from presenting their own view of the facts
unencumbered by interference from the decisionmaker.12 5
More recent research, often using less rigid depictions of the two
models, calls into question Thibaut and Walker's conclusions about
adversarial and inquisitorial procedures. For instance, subsequent
research directly contradicted their finding that culture does not affect
preferences for certain procedures.'29 Furthermore, a number of studies
have challenged the finding that Americans prefer the adversarial
process. Based on this second generation of research, Lind and Tyler
concluded that "pure" adversarial and inquisitorial procedures both have
something to offer in terms of subjective procedural justice, and that
policymakers "should be able to design a variety of hybrid procedures
that engender high[er] levels of perceived fairness."'3
A brief accounting of some of this newer research demonstrates the
type of hybrid procedures that might be perceived as fairer than either of
the pure forms. For example, Blair Sheppard conducted two studies in
which participants were offered four, rather than two, procedural
options: an inquisitorial procedure that involved a single investigator; an
inquisitorial procedure that involved two investigators (one for each side
of the dispute); a pure adversary procedure; and a hybrid procedure that
allowed the disputants to present their evidence and arguments but also
allowed the judge to ask questions and seek clarification.'3 ' He found that
127. John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 386,388 (1972).
128. For a summary of the criticism of Thibaut and Walker's use of "pure" adversarial and
inquisitorial models, see Blair H. Sheppard, Justice is No Simple Matter: Case for Elaborating Our
Model of Procedural Fairness, 49 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953, 953-55 (1985).
129. Rebecca A. Anderson & Amy L. Otto, Perceptions of Fairness in the Justice System: A Cross-
Cultural Comparison, 31 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALrrY 557 (2003) (reporting a study of Dutch and
Americans finding that participants showed a clear preference for their own country's procedures);
Kwok Leung, Cross-Cultural Study of Procedural Fairness and Disputing Behavior, 53 J. PERSONALrrY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 898, 903 (1987) (finding that Chinese preferred mediation to adversarial procedures
and preferred bargaining and inquisitorial adjudication substantially less, and that Americans were
ambivalent about which of the first two procedures they preferred).
130. LIND & TYLER, supra note 119, at 117.
131. Sheppard, supra note 128, at 956-57. Thibaut and Walker conducted a similar study, using
these four models plus a fifth, bargaining model, but did not provide disputants with the ability to
present their own side of the case in any of the inquisitorial conditions. Thibaut et al., supra note 117,
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while the subjects preferred the adversary procedure to the two
inquisitorial procedures, the great majority preferred the hybrid
procedure above any of the other three, apparently because they
perceived it as the most fair.'32
A similar study, conducted by Norman Poythress and his colleagues,
asked mental health professionals to compare the adversarial process to
a number of hybrid alternatives in the context of a simulated medical
malpractice scenario.'33 One hybrid involved the exclusive use of court-
appointed medical experts subject to cross-examination by the parties. A
second hybrid hypothesized a court-appointed research psychologist who
surveyed experts in the field as to their evaluation of various diagnoses
and treatments relevant to the facts of the case. 34 The adversarial model,
in contrast, relied on the parties to find and examine the experts.
Participants evaluated these alternatives in terms of their preference for
the procedure and its perceived fairness, among other variables.'35
Results revealed that each of the hybrid procedures compared
favorably with the adversarial procedures in almost all respects. The
hybrids fared significantly better in terms of perceived accuracy, process
control, fairness, satisfaction regardless of outcome, control of outcome,
and overall preference."x6 The adversarial model was rated most
favorably only with respect to "voice" (involvement in the process).'37 As
Poythress and his colleagues noted, while this latter finding reflected
"the relatively unbridled control over case presentation with that model,
subjects' consistent assignment of more favorable ratings to hybrid
models on other dimensions suggests a willingness to relinquish some of
that control in return for the enhancement of other procedural justice
attributes."'' Accordingly, the results suggested that "there are
variations in the standard adversarial trial procedures that will permit us
to optimize all criteria for a just system and escape the dilemma of a
system that purchases fairness at the expense of (objective and
subjective) accuracy.'
39
Donna Shestowsky's recent research regarding preferences for
dispute resolution methods arrived at similar results.'4 Noting that, due
at I275-79 & n.25.
132. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 1 i9, at 87.
133. Norman Poythress et aL, Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness and Compliance with
Outcomes: A Study of Alternatives to the Standard Adversary Trial Procedure, i8 LAW & HUM. BEH.
361 (1994).
134. Id. at 363.
135. Id. at 365.
136. Id. at 373.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 375.
140. Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Close,
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to the growth of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as
mediation, the "legal landscape has changed remarkably" since Thibaut
and Walker's work in the 1970s, Shestowsky conducted three
experiments designed to investigate preferences for "nonadjudicative" as
well as "adjudicative" procedures.' 4 ' All of the experiments involved a
claim for damages.'42 In order, they investigated whether preferences for
a given procedural model were influenced by (i) the relative status of the
disputants (in terms of age and standing in the community); (2) the
party's role in a dispute (plaintiff or defendant) where the facts favored
one side; and (3) the party's role in a dispute in which the facts were
equally favorable to both the defendant and plaintiff.'43
Shestowsky found that participants' preferences for procedures were
consistent across all the three experiments. Of particular interest here,
she found that, regardless of condition, fewer than ten percent of the
participants rated adjudicative procedures (involving a judge as
decisionmaker and lawyers for both sides) as their preferred method of
dispute resolution.'" She also found that, across all conditions, disputants
preferred "direct control over the presentation of evidence (rather than
using a representative to do so)."'45 Again, these results, which are
representative of a considerable body of research, 46 contrast with the
early findings of Thibaut and Walker, who found, using "pure"7
adversarial and inquisitorial models, that participants are partial to
adversarial procedures and lawyers.
These three studies concluding that hybrid procedures are preferred
to the pure adversarial and inquisitorial models are all subject to
methodological criticism. For instance, the participants in Shestowsky's
study were Stanford students, who might have felt more comfortable
representing themselves than would many others. 47 And in all three
Modern Look at an Old Idea, 1o PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211 (2004).
141. Id. at 213, 230-31.
142. Id. at 246.
143. Id. at 230, 239.
144. Id. at 246 ("Configurations that would represent an adjudicative model (one in which a
neutral third-party makes a binding decision, each party has a lawyer who presents evidence, and the
rules of law apply) did not obtain a first choice rating by even io% of the participants in any of the
experiments.").
145. Id. at 240.
146. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice Research, I Soc. JusT. REs. 41, 45 (1987) ("Often,...
litigants' conceptions of fair process differ from the need to have a formal trial and can be
accommodated in informal dispute resolution settings."); see also William Austin et al., Effect of Mode
of Adjudication, Presence of Defense Counsel, and Favorability of Verdict on Observers' Evaluation of
a Criminal Trial, it J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 281, 297 (I98I) (finding that criminal defendants are
least satisfied when an adjudicative procedure yields an unfavorable outcome, contradicting previous
studies that had suggested that adjudicative procedures are the most preferred dispute resolution
procedure within all outcome conditions).
147. Shestowsky, supra note 140, at 239.
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studies, the stakes involved were minimal, meaning their results might
not be generalizable to criminal prosecutions and similar types of
disputes.8 Finally, all three studies were conducted in the "laboratory,"
using mock scenarios, not disputants involved in actual cases (an external
validity complaint that is also true, it should be noted, of Thibaut and
Walker's work).'49 At the least, however, this type of research calls into
question the latter's findings that adversarial procedures are superior
from a subjective procedural justice perspective.
Surveys of those who have actually experienced differing types of
dispute resolution in the criminal process also challenge that conclusion.
A "meta-analysis" of such surveys, some of which involved offenders
charged with very serious crimes, found that victim-offender mediation
and family conferencing (often with no judges or lawyers involved) were
consistently more successful than traditional criminal justice in fostering
defendants' perceptions of fairness (with 9i% of offenders whose cases
were handled in mediation finding the process fair, versus 78% of those
whose cases were handled by a court).'5° Similar differences were found
in terms of defendants' satisfaction with the handling of their cases (84%
to 73%);5 their perception that they had an opportunity to tell their
stories (88% versus 64%);Y52 their perception that their opinions were
adequately considered (72% versus 55%);Y53 their assessment of the
decisionmaker's fairness (91 % versus 63%);14 and their satisfaction with
the outcome (77% versus 67%).' The differential in victims' reaction to
nonadjudicative and adjudicative procedures was generally even more
148. The scenario in Shestowsky's study involved damage to a $800 bicycle, see id. at 239, while
Poythress' hypothetical involved a psychiatric malpractice suit, posed to mental health professionals.,
Poythress, supra note 133, at 366, and Sheppard questioned undergraduates and airport passengers,
Sheppard, supra note 128, at 956-57. However, other studies producing similar results have been more
closely related to the criminal setting. See Leung, supra note 129, at 903 (using a reckless driving
scenario resulting in physical injury in a study finding no strong preference for adversarial over
mediation procedures); Austin et al., supra note 146 (survey of criminal defendants finding
dissatisfaction with adversarial process when outcome is unfavorable).
149. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 118, at 4.
[W]e have made no attempt to reproduce the richness of variety and detail that exist in the
courtroom and elsewhere in the legal process. Therefore, our settings do not-and do not
attempt to-represent in any complete way the settings to which applications can be made.
Nor do our subjects faithfully represent the personae of the courtroom. With few
exceptions, we have studied university students-from the undergraduate college and the
law school.
Id.
15o. Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological
Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 179-80 tbl.i.
151. Id. at 181 tbl.2.
152. Id. at 183 tbl.3.
153. Id. at 185 tbl.4.
154. Id. at 187 tbl.6.
155. Id. at 193 tbl.9.
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marked, again in favor of the former.,
6
Both experimental research and participant surveys suggest that
alternatives to the traditional adversarial procedure are often perceived as
more fair and more accurate. Whether the latter perception is correct has
also been the subject of empirical study.
B. OBJECTIVE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE/ACcuRACY
Objective procedural justice aims at constructing procedures that
promote accurate decisionmaking. A major challenge to evaluating
objective justice, of course, is the criterion variable: when is a decision
accurate? As Lind and Tyler asked, "how is one to know which
defendants are truly guilty or innocent?"'57 Perhaps because of these
methodological difficulties, the research on objective procedural justice
is decidedly less robust, and thus less definitive, than the research on
subjective procedural justice. Even Thibaut and Walker conceded,
however, that what they called "autocratic" procedure, in which both
process and decision control is delegated to a third party, "is most likely
to produce truth."'"" Their continued preference for the adversary model
stemmed from their belief that "the fundamental objective of the legal
process" is not "the discovery of truth" or "the realization of the most
accurate view of reality," but rather "the attainment of distributive
justice," which they asserted the adversary system, with its requirement
that the parties present their own view of the evidence, is most likely to
achieve.'59
These conclusions were derived primarily from examinations of the
ability of adversarial and inquisitorial procedures to reduce bias and
increase the amount and accuracy of information used by the
decisionmaker. Thibaut & Walker produced the groundbreaking
research in this area as well, and much of it did appear to favor the
adversarial process. For instance, one of their studies found that subjects
who were exposed to new evidence using adversarial procedures relied
less on their existing biases than participants in the inquisitorial
condition.' 6° In another study, this time with Lind as their colleague, they
found that, while law students acting as attorneys usually gathered about
the same number of facts regardless of whether they were placed in an
adversarial or inquisitorial role, attorneys in the adversarial condition
156. Id. at 179-93 tbls.i-9. Many of the studies described in this meta-analysis involved random
assignment. Id. at 169-7o. In some, however, parties chose mediation or refused it; the former group
therefore may have been predisposed to see mediation as beneficial.
157. LIND & TYLER, supra note i 19, at 19.
158. THIRAUT & WALKER, supra note 118, at 547.
159. Id. at 556.
x6o. THBAUT & WALKER, supra note 118, at 41-53; see also John Thibaut et. al., supra note 127, at
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engaged in a more thorough investigation of the facts when the evidence
was unfavorable to the student-attorneys' clients.'6'
Their research did not all point in one direction, however. First, Lind
and Tyler have noted that, contrary to the conclusion one might draw
from the finding reported just above, "there is no real evidence in the
original experiment that inquisitorial procedures suffer from premature
cessation of investigation."' 2 More importantly, a third Thibaut, Walker
& Lind study, which used the same methodology as the latter study but
examined the accuracy of the facts presented, produced results that were
not supportive of the adversarial process.' 63 This study found that when
the evidence favored the client or was balanced, attorneys in both
conditions presented evidence that reflected the facts of the case. When
the facts weighed against the client, however, the adversarial attorneys
were much more likely to present biased evidence, creating 6the
impression that the facts were more evenly balanced than they were.
This research suggested that inquisitorial procedures may result in
the presentation of more accurate and less biased information.'6 5 To test
these propositions further, Sheppard and Vidmar studied the effect of
adversarial and inquisitorial procedures on the preparation of witnesses
and their impact on the decisionmaker, using students as lawyers,
witnesses and judges.' 6 They found that, while witness biasing did not
occur in the inquisitorial condition, "adversary procedures create lawyer
role demands that in turn may result in the biasing of witness
testimony."' 67 Additionally, the data suggested that the biased testimony
influenced the decisionmaker.'6 A second study by Vidmar and Laird
found that bias may be produced simply by labeling a witness the
plaintiff's or the defendant's. This research found that witnesses subtly
varied phrasing of their testimony depending on whether the plaintiff,
the defendant or the court called them, enough so that a three-judge
panel, while perceiving the witness appointed by the court to be
"neutral," were more likely to find for the plaintiff when the witness
testified for the plaintiff, and for the defendant when the witness was
called by the defendant.'
69
161. THMAUT & WALKER, supra note 118, at 41-53.
162. LIND & TYLER, supra note I19, at 114.
163. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note i18, at 28-40.
164. Id.
165. As Lind and Tyler point out, "[o]ne interpretation of the results of this study might be that
the inquisitorial procedure leads to better information gathering and presentation." LIND & TYLER,
supra note I19, at 25.
I66. Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar. Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial Evidence:
Effects of Lawyer's Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320,322 (198o).
167. Id. at 329.
168. Id.
169. Neil Vidmar & N.M. Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on Witnesses'
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As with much of the research on subjective procedural justice, the
generalizability of this experimental work to the real world can be
questioned. But impressionistic evidence from observers of our legal
system supports the surmise that the adversarial process obstructs access
to evidence and produces biased information, especially as it operates in
the criminal justice system. American prosecutors are routinely blamed
for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence or information that could be
used to challenge the credibility of witnesses.'7" Defense attorneys
commonly raise obstructionist objections and introduce questionable
evidence in an effort to create reasonable doubt.'7 ' In contrast, in more
inquisitorial systems such as those in many European countries, the
practice of judicial investigation substantially reduces the pressure on the
parties to produce or withhold evidence to win a case.'72 Coaching of
witnesses is unethical,'73 and the evidence produced does not depend on
prosecutorial whim or the energy or resources of the defense.'74 On
objective measures as well, the adversarial system may not provide the
optimal procedure.
C. EFFICIENCY
Research providing statistical information is likely to have its most
conspicuous impact in connection with this third prong of the Mathews
test. The costs of certain procedures, both in terms of direct expenditures
on the process and in terms of the monies thereby diverted from other
parts of the system are, in theory at least, more quantifiable than either
subjective or objective justice. Social science can therefore make
Communication of Evidence and the Assessment of Adjudicators, 44 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
888 (1983). It should be noted, however, that this study did not involve a witness testifying for the
other side, which might have reduced the biasing effect.
170. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper
Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 697-703, 720-30 (1987) (cataloguing scores of instances in which
prosecutors failed to turn over exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), but only nine cases in which discipline was considered and only two which resulted in serious
sanction).
171. One judge is particularly adamant in making this claim. HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE
COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 141 (1996) ("Given the probability that the defendant is guilty, the
defense attorney knows that the defendant will win only if counsel is successful in preventing the truth
from being disclosed-or, failing that, misleading the jury once it is disclosed. So, when the defendant
is guilty, the defense attorney's role is to prevent, distort, and mislead." (emphasis omitted)).
172. Mirjan Damalka, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083,
1093-94 n.22 (1975) (Under an adversary model, "the adversaries are often reluctant to exchange
information about the evidence discovered, while the nonadversary agency entrusted with preparation
of the case for trial will, as a rule, transmit all it has unearthed to the court.").
173. Id. at io88-89 (In a nonadversary system, "[tihe parties are not supposed to try to affect, let
alone to prepare, the witnesses' testimony at trial. 'Coaching' witnesses comes dangerously close to
various criminal offenses of interfering with the administration of justice.").
174. See generally Mirjan Damalka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 582 (1973) ("An official inquiry
must... disregard possible interparty arrangements, and pursue the search for the real truth.").
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contributions here as well.
Unfortunately, to date, there appear to be no studies directly
comparing the costs of inquisitorial, adversarial, and hybrid procedures
in a given legal setting. But the Supreme Court's assumption, in cases
like Mathews and Parham, that adversarial procedures are more
expensive is not unreasonable, especially if such procedures include the
jury trial. Indeed, it may be because of its expense that the American
criminal process rarely actually uses the adversarial process,'75 and
instead relies primarily on plea-bargaining, which is itself inquisitorial in
nature. 76
Another cost that should be factored into the efficiency calculus is
the extent to which parties to the dispute can afford the process.
Privately financed evidence collection, which is the hallmark of the
adversarial system, may discriminate against the poor. In an inquisitorial
system, on the other hand, the judge/decisionmaker is responsible for
developing the evidence and can be of significant assistance to an
indigent defendant."
All of this is speculative. But, as with the research on subjective and
objective justice, these comments about efficiency call into question the
superiority of the adversarial process.
IV. INTEGRATING LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN PURSUIT OF
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS: TOWARD A PERFORMANCE-BASED
SYSTEM OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
The upshot of the procedural justice research is that the automatic
equation of adversarial procedures and "fairness" or accuracy is not
warranted. It may well be that, in some settings, alternatives to a process
in which parties represented by counsel are responsible for providing and
challenging evidence better promote both subjective and objective
justice, and will often cost less as well. The central question raised by this
Article is whether the juvenile delinquency proceeding is one of those
175. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETrncs OF LAWYERING 469 (2d ed. 1994) (citing
studies showing that 90-95 % of all civil and criminal cases are settled rather than tried).
176. Gerald E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2003) ("[T]he defining characteristic of the existing 'plea bargaining' system
is that it is an informal, administrative, inquisitorial process of adjudication, internal to the
prosecutor's office-in absolute distinction from a model of adversarial determination of fact and law
before a neutral judicial decision maker."). Note, however, that an inquisitorial system can be
inefficient and expensive as well. See Marcus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay
Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 558-81 (1997) (explaining
inefficiencies of German criminal procedure).
177. See Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland. From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the
Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 146 (Carol Steiker ed., 20o6) ("Appointed
defense counsel are often chronically underfunded, overworked, and of uneven competence.... Thus,
defendants would.., prefer a quasi-inquisitorial system, with a neutral magistrate who is charged with
digging up the truth.").
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settings.
Unfortunately, we cannot answer that question here. Although the
research we have briefly surveyed suggests that the procedures that many
consider the gold standard of due process do not deserve that status, it
only begins to answer the inquiry. Since no research focusing on various
alternatives in the juvenile justice setting exists, we would be foolish to
suggest otherwise.
The point we can make, one that is a predicate for answering the
above question, is that decisions about fundamental fairness should be
performance-based and management-oriented. By that we mean to
endorse the following basic tenets:
i. Consistent with Mathews, procedures should be constructed so as to
promote individual and public perceptions of fairness, accurate
decision making, and the efficient use of available resources in a way
that in fact optimizes fairness and accuracy.
2. The best method of determining whether specific procedures meet
this goal is through ongoing feedback, evaluation and reform, both in
individual cases and systemically, in the experimental spirit endorsed
by Judge Friendly.
3. An administrative mechanism that can manage this evaluation
process must exist.
The application of these tenets to juvenile justice requires, first and
foremost, that questions about the appropriate procedure in the juvenile
justice system be recast into empirical hypotheses rather than framed, as
they have been up to now, by reference to adult criminal procedure
requirements. Whether decisionmaking accuracy and fairness are best
promoted by a judge, a hearing officer, or a layperson; multiple or single
decisionmakers; and the rights to cross-examination, silence and the
assistance of counsel are all empirical questions.
Of course, these questions are pertinent in the adult criminal justice
setting as well. A fundamental fairness/performance-based approach to
answering them requires, as Justices Harlan and Frankfurter emphasized,
that any special attributes of the setting in question be taken into
account. In the juvenile justice context, these special aspects might
include the facts that juveniles tend to be dependent on and under the
authority of others, are less likely than adults to be competent to make
the types of decisions that arise in the legal arena,"" and are less willing
than adults to reveal their thoughts and feelings.'79 They may also be
178. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile
Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 797 (2005) (reporting a recent study by the MacArthur Foundation
"found a high risk of trial incompetence among younger teens and even mid-adolescents using the
measures applied to adults").
179. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 429 (2d ed. 1997) (A "common problem" among
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particularly sensitive to any failure on the part of legal actors to listen to
their story and treat them with dignity.' Taking these considerations
into account, we should be open to the possibility that juveniles charged
with crime will respond better to "social-worker" judges than distant,
passive decisionmakers, and that informal hearings are more likely than
public, jury trials to produce an environment conducive to obtaining
relevant adjudicative and dispositional facts.' sI We should also be willing
to contemplate the possibilities that party control of evidence obfuscates
rather than clarifies, I82 that rigorous cross-examination is not the
"greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,' ',,8 and
that unfamiliar defense counsel and rules of evidence curb juveniles'
ability to tell their story.' 8 Research on "teen courts," for instance,
suggests that an adjudicative process that mimics aspects of the
European inquisitorial model might be more "therapeutic" for juveniles
and more effective at curbing their antisocial behavior than the
traditional adversarial model.'""
juvenile offenders is that they "'clam up,' or, alternatively, try to present themselves as streetwise
'tough guys,' lest clinicians conclude that they are crazy [or weak].").
18o. See Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18 Soc.
JUST. RES. 217, 217 (2005) (reporting a study indicating that youth view the legal system as less
legitimate and with more cynicism when interactions with legal actors are viewed as unfair or harsh).
181. The Honorable Anthony J. Sciolino, The Changing Role of the Family Court Judge: New
Ways of Stemming the Tide, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 395, 400 (2005). Sciolino endorses a
process involving:
(I) speaking directly to the defendant rather than defense counsel; (2) working
collaboratively with a treatment team; (3) being a proactive participant in a non-adversarial
process; (4) applying a direct, immediate and personal approach to each ... offender; and
(5) recognizing success with praise, applause, rewards, or a graduation ceremony in the
courtroom.
Id.
182. Cf. LIND & TYLER, supra note I19, at 114 (countering Thibaut & Walker's argument that the
adversarial process enhances distributive justice through helping "disadvantaged" litigants by noting
that the "disadvantage" is often simply a "paucity of evidence," not social or economic disadvantage).
183. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1376 (3d ed. 1940). Roger
Park has described ways in which cross-examination may expose perjurers, but has also noted that
"adversarial cross-examination may often be simply 'dramatized argument,"' and that "the adversarial
context of cross-examination undoubtedly inhibits the asking of clarifying questions, because fear of
backfire prevents advocates from delving in the unknown." Roger C. Park, Adversarial Influences on
the Interrogation of Trial Witnesses, in ADVERSARIAL V. INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 131, 145-63, t66 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod
eds., 2004). Thus, he suggests that jurors be allowed to ask clarifying questions and that, "in high-
stakes criminal cases," a lawyer assist them in this enterprise, a procedure which is, at the least, quasi-
inquisitorial. Id. at 166.
184. Cf. State v. Van Sickle, 411 N.W.2d 665, 666-67 (S.D. 1987) (Courts should warn defendants
who wish to proceed pro se that "'presenting a defense is not a simple matter of telling one's story,'
but requires adherence to various 'technical rules' governing the conduct of a trial." (quoting WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11- 5 (1984))).
185. Allison R. Shiff & David B. Wexler, Teen Court: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, in
LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 287, 290-95 (David B.
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) (reporting possible psychological benefits and low recidivism
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Finally, in a performance-based management system the spirit of
ongoing evaluation and feedback characterizes not only the evaluation of
the decisionmaking procedures, but also assessment of the system's
ability to promote substantive policy objectives, such as rehabilitation,
crime prevention, deterrence, restitution, and retribution. As Mathews
itself suggested,' 86 inquisitorial methods might be perceived as fairer and
more accurate when the inquiry is "scientific," and thus might be
preferable when the decision is a clinical judgment about whether a
juvenile needs treatment to prevent recidivism (the principal goal of a
preventive-rehabilitative system) rather than a moral judgment about
blameworthiness and punishment.'8 7 Even if, however, the juvenile
justice system continues its trend toward a punitive regime, the choice
between the traditional adversarial model and a more investigative
approach is not a foregone conclusion, as the European example
illustrates. The procedural choice should not be based, as it has largely
been up to now, on whether the juvenile justice system is genuinely
therapeutic (and therefore does not require more "protective"
adversarial procedures), but rather should be driven primarily by an
empirical assessment of which procedural mix best achieves the goals of
the system, whatever they are.
The choice of procedures will also be affected by other empirical
considerations. It may be, for example, that certain approaches directly
contribute to a substantive policy objective, rather than merely facilitate
its implementation. For instance, some research suggests that
"relational" procedures focused on promoting dignity are better at
reducing recidivism independent of whether they produce outcomes the
juvenile prefers.8 Along the same lines, research suggests that the right
to silence inhibits prospects for rehabilitation.' 89 Another consideration
rates associated with teen court and noting that "the teen court model described here seems to share
some important features with the Continental criminal justice system").
186. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322 (1976) ("The decision whether to discontinue
disability benefits will normally turn upon 'routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by
physician specialists."' (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (971))).
187. However, we would be the first to concede that the latter judgments are far from infallible.
See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. I, 6-11 (2oo3).
188. Shelly Jackson & Mark R. Fondacaro, Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Conflict:
Implications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 LAW & POL'Y t01, ii6 (I999) (finding that adolescents
who reported that their parents did not treat them with dignity were more likely to engage in deviant
behavior); William R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation and the Prevalence
and Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 137, i60-62, 164
(analysis of fifteen studies that found that juvenile offenders who take part in mediation are up to
twenty-six percent less likely to recidivate than those who go to court and commit less severe
offenses).
189. Self-Incrimination Rights Conflicts with Treatment, Home Release Programs, 4 CORRECTiONAL
L. REP. 1 (1992); see also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschback, Integrating Remorse and
Apology into Criminal Procedure, I14 YALE L.J. 85, 148 (2004) ("If encouraged in the right way,
remorse and apology can help offenders cleanse their consciences and return to the moral fold," and
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might be whether the chosen procedure would permit synergies with
other child-based legal agendas. For example, a modern trend in family
law is toward the unification of legal systems dealing with cases involving
children (e.g., dependency, divorce, custody, delinquency)." The
purpose of this unified court is to have all legal matters involving
children and families addressed by a single decisionmaker rather than
subject the same family to multiple jurisdictions and judges, an
arrangement that might provide significant benefits to juvenile
offenders.'9 ' Insistence on strict adversarial safeguards for delinquency
cases could make this integration unfeasible, however, given the less
formal procedures relied on by other family law courts. The important
point is that data should be collected in an ongoing manner to assess the
extent to which specified and adopted policy objectives are being met at
the individual-child level and with respect to the system as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Justice Fortas was correct when he proclaimed that juvenile
offenders prior to the Kent decision experienced the worst of both
worlds, neither adequate due process protection nor effective
rehabilitation. For several decades, juvenile justice reforms; instigated by
lawyers and assisted by advocacy-oriented social scientists; sought to fix
the juvenile justice system by focusing on providing children with adult
procedural "safeguards." The reformers' hope was that children would at
least get the best of one world: adult criminal due process protections. As
a result, children now have adult-like procedural safeguards.
We have seen, however, that these modern procedural reforms rest
on the misguided assumption that adult criminal procedures necessarily
provide the ultimate in due process protections. When instead
procedural due process is conceptualized in terms of fundamental
fairness based on maximizing accuracy, fairness, and efficiency in
decisionmaking, its implementation becomes an empirical question open
to feedback and based on particular contextual demands. Procedural
justice research to date casts serious doubt on the reformers' premise.
Another premise of the reformers is that the backward-looking,
culpability-based system of justice is both morally superior and less
subject to abuse than the preventive model.'92 Thus, along with adult
"procedure can and should make more room for the substantive values that these expressions serve.").
19o. See Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court: Balancing
Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L.Q. 381, 397 (2003).
191. Id. at 396 (The unified court's ability "to integrate a juvenile's behavior, environment,
history-and family-into a service-oriented, therapeutic remedy" is its "greatest strength in
addressing delinquency matters.").
192. See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 34-35
(1982) (recommending that "just deserts" determine sentencing in the juvenile delinquency context);
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procedures have come adult liability principles. Calls for more
retribution and punishment have hardened, while support for
rehabilitation-Justice Fortas' other bad "world"-has diminished.
While a performance-based management system focused on fundamental
fairness does not require the adoption of any particular policy objective,
we have argued elsewhere that a rehabilitation-oriented regime focused
on risk management and crime prevention is preferable to a punishment-
based model.'93 We believe that if the juvenile justice system develops a
focus on both fundamental fairness and maintains its rehabilitative and
preventive goals, children will truly receive the best of both worlds:
procedural safeguards that have a demonstrated impact on the fairness
and accuracy of decisionmaking, and intervention programs focused on
principles of least restrictive intervention and crime prevention.
Feld, supra note 13, at 131-32 (recommending a culpability-based system because the rehabilitative
approach relies on "rudimentary and unproven treatment techniques," and because the juvenile court
cannot "combine successfully criminal social control and social welfare in one system").
593. See Christopher Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of
Kansas v. Hendricksfor Children, 1999 Wis. L. Rav. 185.
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